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I.

This

and was

a breach 0f

is

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

employment contract

manages vast amounts 0f land
growing private real

WPT’S

LLC

in Idaho.

estate practice within

sole in-house counsel.

(hereinafter

Hawes by

service as

WPT’S

in

all

offer,

After Mr.

The
trial

to

be employed

was a generous severance package made

Hawes and WPT’S

sole

owner reached

as

this

accounts thereafter provided dedicated, loyal and high-quality legal

WPT

made

the business decision t0 shut

be paid the agreed upon severance package. But,

and defenses,

leave his actively

one 0f Idaho’s most reputable law ﬁrms,

department. This ended Mr. Hawes’ employment with

and a ﬁve day jury

WPT t0

house counsel for approximately twelve years.

In January 0f 2017,

t0

company which owns and

a

is

The most attractive part 0fthe inducement, and the primary basis

employment agreement.

agreement, Mr.

“WPT”)

Mr. Hawes was induced by

upon Which Mr. Hawes agreed t0 accept WPT’S
part of the

is

times relevant an experienced and well-known real estate attorney in Idaho. The

at all

Appellant Western Paciﬁc Timber,

as

The Respondent Andrew (Andy) Hawes

case.

in

trial

WPT.

It

its

also triggered

WPT refused.

Which the jury unanimously found

down

in-house legal

Mr. Hawes’ right

After two years of litigation

in favor

0f Mr. Hawes on

all

claims

WPT still refused.

trial

was followed by

several

months 0f post-trial motions which culminated with the

judge, the Honorable Gerald Schroeder, expressing his overall View on

progressed and

how the

defense treated the Plaintiff:

There were n0 reasonable offers 0f settlement in
plaintiff

was offered a scrap and threatened With

attacks

on

honesty and integrity. If he did not accept the nuisance value
there

was no real alternative but
saw little likelihood that the

t0

go

t0 trial.

The

this case.

At

his

offer,

the outset this

However,
humiliation
threats
and
the
0f public
as
progressed
diminished and the comparative integrity and credibility of the
witnesses evolved, the balance shifted, as evidenced by the jury
court

the

trial

plaintiff could prevail.

how

the case

verdict.

It is

wage claim law

consistent With the purpose 0f the

t0

allow him the beneﬁt of that verdict.
Clerk’s Record, p. I461

pay Mr. Hawes

.

Following

With

his severance agreement.

0n

this

appeal they

still

still

refused t0

do.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

II.

The

conﬁrmation of the claim, the Defendant

this

appeal are largely fact driven. The Appellant’s opening line in

its

brief

recognizes this by saying the case “presents issues related t0 the sufﬁciency 0f evidence.”

It is

issues

this

thus clear the evidence presented at

militates a

need for a fair portrayal 0f the

the Appellant does not provide.

Andy Hawes

Law and was

the

t0

worked

evidence, which the Respondent respectfully submits

Who

graduated from the University of Idaho College of

for several

7,

l.

7 —p. 18,

WPT, which had
acquire

l.

25.

He was

In 2004, he

& Burke law ﬁrm, joining the ﬁrm as a partner.

In late 2004/ear1y 2005, the

all

just

Elam

been formed by

the land being sold

l.

For his ﬁrst

6.

companies and ﬁrms developing expertise as a real

as a solo real estate practitioner for a time.

Elam

This

Emplovment Agreement

a native Idahoan

Tn, April 30, 2019, p. I

attorney.

trial

admitted t0 the Idaho bar in early 1995. Tn, April 30, 2019, p. I5,

eight or nine years he

own

is

plays a particularly important role in this appeal.

A more comprehensive and fair statement 0f facts follows.

Background Leading up

A.

trial

successful

merged

enough

to

estate

go out 0n

his

his real estate practice with

Tn, April 30, 2019, p.23, L.

5.

& Burke ﬁrm was contacted about doing legal work for

its

sole owner,

Mr. Tim Blixseth.

by the Boise Cascade company

needed serious legal help for these transactions.

Tr.,

in Idaho

WPT

was looking

and Washington, and

April 30, 2019, pp. 25-2 7.

to

WPT

WPT had already

hired attorneys in the State of Washington to address the approximate 150,000 acres of land

purchased from Boise Cascade in Washington. Tn, April 30, 2019,

p

28,

ll.

1-8.

However,

WPT

did not have any contacts 0r connections in Idaho t0 address the approximate 178,000 acres 0f land

being purchased in Idaho. Tn, April 30, 2019, L. 9-1 5. At Elam
to their real estate specialist

Mr. Hawes,

Who

& Burke, the matter was referred

then provided a variety 0f legal services for

over a number ofmonths beginning in January 0f 2005. Tn, April 30, 2019, p. 28,

began with Mr. Hawes drafting and ﬁling the necessary documents

company qualiﬁed to d0 business
agent for

WPT.

substantial

WPT’S

legal

owner Mr.

work

Blixseth.

for

WPT

April 30, 2019, pp. 29

—

ll.

WPT’s owner Mr.

178,000 acres 0f Idaho land

Blixseth asking if he

The Appellant misstates

WPT.

on

interested in

for.

would be

WPT just purchased.

Mr. Hawes’ actual

trial

WPT, Mr. Hawes

Tn,

0n

received an

interested in leaving private practice

Tn, April 30, 2019, p. 39,

ll.

24-25; p. 40,

ll.

I-

this central factual point regarding the

Appellant asserts Mr. Blixseth “inquired whether

working in-house, doing

WPT, Yellowstone Club, and YCW.”

this subject.

listed as the registered

Term is Reached

the actual testimony

employer Mr. Hawes was recruited to work

including

as a foreign

over the next several months, working closely with

the Severance

and work as the sole in-house counsel for

Hawes would be

WPT

Mr. Hawes thereafter provided a very

2-21.

In June 0f 2005, after closing the land sale transactions for

2.

19-21. This

38.

The Oral Agreement with

email from

ll.

This culminated with closing the land transactions and getting

WPT prepared t0 commence managing the

B.

Which Mr. Hawes himself is

Tn, April 30, 2019, p. 30,

amount of

sole

in Idaho, in

to register

WPT

legal

work for Blixseth’s many companies,

Appellant ’s Briefat 3. That was not the testimony

testimony 0n this subject was:

had received an email from Mr. Blixseth inquiring Whether
had an interest in joining Western Paciﬁc Timber as an in-

I

0r not

I

house attorney.
Tr.,

April 30, 2019, p. 39,

Hawes performed over

ll.

24-25; p. 40,

the prior several

ll.

1-2 (emphasis added). A11 of the legal

months was exclusively

for the

newly

work Mr.

active business

entity

Western Paciﬁc Timber. Western Paciﬁc Timber was suddenly doing actual business

Idaho for the ﬁrst time, but
attorney to d0 legal

work

it

had n0

legal department.

relating to the

It

a dinner meeting

was

set

up

The substantive
he made working

at

ll.

20. In response,

and

mid-June 0f

& Burke, and Mr. Hawes responded that he was 0n track t0 make about
ll.

Mr. Blixseth then made a speciﬁc offer

9-12.

become in-house counsel

to

for

WPT.

Tn, April 30, 2019, p. 46,

Mr. Hawes had what he called a “pushback” against

years building up his

in

further

began With Mr. Blixseth asking Mr. Hawes how much

$100,00 that year. Tn, April 30, 2019, p. 45,

pay Mr. Hawes $100,000

downtown Boise

it

11-25.

part of the meeting

Elam

might need an in-house

it

interested in talking about

for this purpose at a restaurant in

2005. Tn, April 30, 2019, p. 40,

sense

massive amount 0f Idaho land Which suddenly needed to

WPT. Mr. Hawes responded he would be

be managed by

made

in

book 0f real

estate business until this time,

and

this

it

ll.

to

1 7-

because he had spent 10

was

still

growing; he would

accordingly be just giving that up for n0 increase in salary. In Mr. Hawes’ words at

trial:

had a little bit of pushback because — since I was
making roughly the same at Elam & Burke that I could potentially
be making at Western Paciﬁc Timber. I had a little bit 0f concern
because I had worked so hard t0 build up my practice to get to that
point. And, in essence, What he was asking me t0 d0 is t0 abandon
my clients and leave my business, t0 start a new venture With a new
company at the same amount that I was making at Elam & Burke.
Well,

And

I

I

expressed that as a concern.

Tn, April 30, 2019, p. 46,

ll.

23-25; p. 47,

ll.

1-8.

To

that point,

Mr. Blixseth had a two-fold

response, which for the present purpose most notably included the severance agreement:

So

0f exciting things
grow.

I

One: “We’re going t0 d0 a lot
Western Paciﬁc Timber. We’re intending t0

his response

want

to

at

make

was two

fold.

a run at buying other land in Idaho.

grows. But what

I

would agree — What

give you a severance package.

I

offer t0

And

s0

company
you would be I will

there Will be opportunities t0 earn additional salary as the

And

was

the severance package

this:

Western Paciﬁc Timber

would agree to give me severance, $100,000 per vear for everv
vear that I was with the company, up t0 ﬁve vears. So, there was
a cap at ﬁve vears.
Tn, April 30, 2019, p. 47,

12-23 (emphasis added). Mr.

ll.

Hawes asked about one

other item.

He

had just been elected to be a commissioner With the Idaho State Bar, which he of course considered
an honor and wanted t0 make sure Mr. Blixseth would be okay with him fulﬁlling his duties as a

commissioner for the

entire term,

we

Well, so after

you

in?”

And

Tn, April 30, 2019, p. 49,

I

ll.

Which he was. The deal was then

sealed:

discussed the terms his response was, “Well are

said “Absolutely,”

and

I

shook his hand.

Mr. Hawes then conclusively testiﬁed that the employment

8-11.

agreement in question was very deﬁnitely reached

at this

dinner meeting:

Q. So was the deal struck at this meeting?
A. Yes.
Q. What were the essential terms? Tell the iurv.
A. That I would receive a salarv 0f $100,000, and then the

severance agreement that
continue With

I

and then that

described,

mv work at the Idaho

I

could

State Bar.

Q. Who was that agreement with?
A. Western Paciﬁc Timber.
Tn, April 30, 2019, p. 50,
After the meeting,

up a
ll.

bottle

1 0-18.

1-10 (emphasis added).

ll.

Andy was

0f champagne on his

good news With

excited t0 share the

way home

to celebrate.

Tic,

and he picked

April 30, 2019., p. 49,

l.

11; p. I 16,

His Wife Gretchen was also excited, particularly about the severance part of the

agreement, which she thought of as great retirement planning

Tr.,

his wife

April 30, 2019, p. 129,

Z.

25; p. 126,

l.

I.

T0

that end,

(“it’s like

putting

money in a vault”).

Mrs. Hawes testiﬁed that for the next

12 years, she and her husband changed their ﬁnancial retirement planning because they had the

severance agreement in place.

Tic,

April 30, 2019, p. 130,

ll.

3-] 0.

WPT and Mr. Hawes After Agreement Reached

Communications Between

C.

Mr. Hawes’ ﬁrst day 0f reporting

t0

work

as in-house counsel for

WPT

was August

1,

2005, meaning approximately ﬁve 0r six weeks after the dinner meeting where the “essential
terms” 0f the oral employment agreement were reached. Tn, April 30, 2019, p.
intervening timeframe, the parties exchanged a

In this

9.

l.

number 0f written communications and emails

received considerable attention at

trial.

Defendant’s Exhibits 506, 51 0, 51 I

These written exchanges boil down

.

73,

See,

e,g.

Plaintiﬁ’iv Exhibits 6,

7,

t0 just

8,

I 0,

and

12;

conﬁrming

that

in

one

way 0r another that the subj ect employment agreement, including the severance package provision,
had

in fact

WPT through its

been orally reached between Mr. Hawes and

sole

owner

at the

time

Mr. Blixseth.

By the time of trial, n0 one knew where Mr.

Blixseth

was located and n0 one expected him

to testify.

The written communications

t0 buttress

Mr. Hawes’ testimony about that meeting and the agreement

6, for

example,

is

a letter dated July

8,

after the dinner

meeting between the parties thus served

2005 from Mr. Hawes

to

itself.

Plaintiff s Exhibit

Mr. Blixseth conﬁrming the terms

0fthe employment agreement speciﬁcally including the severance agreement 0f $100,000 per year

of employment, capped out at 5 years and $500,000. The
not long after their Boise meeting to

conﬁrm

Mr. Hawes’ testimony about the agreement.

fact that

this serious

It

severance agreement term substantiates

would make no sense

Mr. Blixseth conﬁrming this six ﬁgure term 0f the contract
Similarly, Plaintiff” s Exhibit 7

explaining he

reached.

It

was

is

Mr. Hawes wrote to Mr. Blixseth

if it

for

Mr. Hawes

to write t0

had not been part 0f the agreement.

an email from Mr. Hawes t0 Mr. Blixseth 0n July

attaching an outline

8,

2005,

Which again identiﬁes the employment terms already

includes the speciﬁc terms 0f the severance agreement, and added

not yet discussed for Mr. Blixseth t0 consider. Mr. Blixseth’s response

is

some items they had

also included in Exhibit

7 which indicates he had received

agreement.

it

and would “take a 100k”

Plaintiff’s Exhibit 8 is a later slightly

employment

at the attached draft

modiﬁed version 0f

the proposed written

agreement. Both 0f these exhibits amount to a proposed formal written Employment Agreement

from Mr. Hawes, but they were never signed. Tn, April
These communications between

WPT

30, 2019, p. 85,

ll.

and Mr. Hawes before

corroborate that the oral agreement in June had been reached.

8-15; p. 97,

m

The communication speciﬁcally

jointly signed agreement, the

any

effect at all

0n the three

While these writings

show Mr. Hawes’ unsuccessful

possible terms t0 add, and they

more signiﬁcant point
essential terms 0f the

is

that

16-21.

day 0f work

his ﬁrst

included the most important “essential term,” the severance agreement.
address

ll.

none 0f them sought

attempts t0 get a

t0

change or have

agreement conclusively reached

at the

dinner

meeting in June.

D.

Mr. Hawes Goes

t0

Work as WPT’s In-House Counsel

Mr. Hawes started working as in-house counsel for WPT on August
ofﬁce headquarters in Boise. Tn, April 30, 2019, p,
this subject as well, asserting

ofﬁce space with

WPT.”

Mr. Hawes went

Appellant ’s Briefat

t0

6.

73,

work

The

l.

9.

1,

2005

at

WPT’S new

Appellant misstates the testimony on

in “the

BGI

legal department”

actual testimony

on this subj ect

and “shared

is

as follows:

Q. Okay. Then we get to August 1, 2005. Tell us what happened.
A. So August 1, 2005, I started my ﬁrst day With Western Paciﬁc

m.
Q.
A.

Where
I

did you go to work?

went

t0 the

Western Paciﬁc Timber ofﬁce
Bank building suite. But

construction at the U.S.

was

was under
was there. It

that
it

at that suite.

Tn, April 30, 2019, p. 73,
the door 0f this ofﬁce

ll.

7-15.

The testimony

in this regard also

“was Western Paciﬁc Timber.” Tn, April

added

that the only sign

30, 2019, p. 73,

l.

19-20.

on

The

telephones in that ofﬁce were answered as the caller having reached “Western Paciﬁc Timber.”

April 30, 2019, p. 73,

Tr.,

ll.

The email address Mr. Hawes had on the

21-22.

employment was ahawes@wptimber.com. Tn, April

30, 2019, p. 73,

longstanding controller in Boise as a defense Witness at

was going on

that

May 2,

in Idaho out

2019, p. 276,

ll.

I 7—25; p. 277,

ll.

own

ll.

its

that everything

Tr.,

1-2 (emphasis added).

absolutely not the location of “BGI’S legal department” or any

BGI department. BGI was nothing more than a holding company that owned other business

entities

81,

and he acknowledged

called

of WPT’S Boise ofﬁce was “Western Paciﬁc Timber related.”

WPT’s Boise ofﬁce was
other

trial

WPT

18-19.

ll.

ﬁrst day of

and did administrative matters, but

13-25.

Its

ofﬁce was in California.

it

did n0 other business at

Tr.,

April 30, 2019, p. 82,

all.

ll.

April 30, 2019, p.

Tr.,

18-21.

in-house counsel, also referred to as BGI’s “chief attorney” that “handled

May

Blixseth Group, Inc.”

Tn, April 30, 2019, p. 104,

BGI had no need at all

for a legal ofﬁce in Boise, Idaho. Tr., Vol,

E.

ll.

12-15;

Tr.,

1,

I,

p. 82,

BGI

its

the matters for

all

2019, p. 186,

ll.

had

ll.

21-24.

18-25.

WPT Experiences Changes but Mr. Hawes’ Job as In-House Counsel Stavs the Same
During the twelve years Mr. Hawes was in house counsel for

WPT,

the

company went

through some changes of one kind or another, but his job as in-house counsel for

change

also

at all.

For example, in 2006

Tn, April 30, 2019, p. 84,
30, 2019, p. 86,

ll.

8.

l.

6.

2019, p. 90,

ll.

Each ofthe three owners of WPT had a one-third

Mr. Hawes job as WPT’s only in-house attorney did not change
l.

at all

With

20.

Tr.,

April 30,

WPT elected to open an ofﬁce in Portland, Oregon and shut down the Boise

ofﬁce. Tn, April 30, 2019, p. 92,

in-house counsel, but

Tn, April

interest.

WPT sold all of its land holdings in Idaho to Potlatch Corporation.

14—23.

did not

WPT had two new partial owners, in addition t0 Mr. Blixseth.

the change in ownership, nor did any 0f his daily duties, Tn, April 30, 2019, p. 86,

In 2007,

WPT

it

l.

13.

required Mr.

to

remain in his position as WPT’s

move his

family to Portland, Which he did

Mr. Hawes was asked

Hawes

to agree to

in the spring

0f 2008. Tn, April 30, 2019, p. 95,

was presented With some
working

back

to

Idaho on

22-25.

ll.

WPT business.

WPT

Hawes found himself

Tn, April 30, 2019, p. 95,

ll.

Throughout these couple of years 0f moving back and forth

and Boise, Mr. Hawes continued

2019, p. 96,

Within a couple of years, however,

WPT re-opened an ofﬁce in Boise, and Mr. Hawes moved his family back t0 Boise.

Tn, April 30, 2019, p. 95,
to Portland

6.

opportunities back in Idaho, and for a While Mr.

in Portland but travelling

8-1 8. In 2010,

l.

1-14.

ll.

in his role as general counsel for

WPT.

Tr.,

April 30,

Regarding the move back t0 Boise, Mr. Hawes testiﬁed:

Again. .there was a conscious decision by Western Paciﬁc Timber
that I needed t0 be back in Idaho t0 gear up on Idaho timber
.

So

operations.

it

made

sense to

move back to

Boise. So

we moved

back.

Tn, April 30, 2019, p. 103,

WPT

ll.

3-7 (emphasis added).

experienced a big change in 2012.

dispute with his

operations of WPT. Mr. Blixseth had at

result

He was

had a serious business

two other co-owners 0f WPT. The outcome was Mr. Blixseth being ousted from

having any role in the management 0f

The

In short, Mr. Blixseth

WPT. These two

all

other co-owners then took over the

times before that been the day-to-day manager of WPT.

of this business divorce among the owners was that Mr. Hawes had two

assigned some additional management duties by the two

nothing about his role as in-house counsel for

Q.

And how

new

co-owners.

new

bosses.

Otherwise

WPT changed at all:

did that change your daily

work

at

Western

Paciﬁc Timber?

was doing the same duties. But out of that,
I was appointed as general manager 0f
Western Paciﬁc Timber in addition to general counsel. So I was
doing general counsel stuff, responsibilities and duties that I was
doing since 2005, but then added onto that was general management.
A.

It

was

- - I

actually, that process,

Tn, April 30, 2019, p. 105,

decided t0 shut

down

its

ll.

I 7-25.

Mr. Hawes’ role with

WPT remained this way until WPT

in-house legal department in late 2016.

WPT Terminates Legal Department But Engages in Subterfuge With Mr. Hawes

F.

The owners 0f WPT met on December
department. Tn,

shortly after

it

May 3,

2019, p. I9,

was made, however,

16,

2016 and decided t0 eliminate

14-24. Rather than simply

ll.

WPT

unexpectedly. This started With one of the co-owners of

from Pittsburgh

WPT’S

decision t0 shut

May

2,

WPT’S

down

it

the

ll.

Tr.,

May

3,

2019, p. 19,

ll.

controller in the Boise ofﬁce, Mr.

10-1 7.

This

ll.

2-9; p. 283,

ll.

15-25; p. 284,

ll.

CFO then ﬂew in from Pittsburgh on January 9,

hatched the plan t0

May

2,

tell

then had several

John Lightner, advising him of the

1-6.

it

conﬁdential.

Mr. Lightner had worked with
Tn,

May

2,

2019, p.

2017 and met with Mr. Lightner and

Mr. Hawes the next morning 0f the decision

2019, p. 288,

ll.

2-15; p. 289,

meeting for the morning of January
to

CFO

7-18.

The

Tic,

news suddenly and

the legal department, but requested that Mr. Lightner keep

2019, p. 29,

10,

ll.

t0 terminate his

employment.

They had previously scheduled a budget

20-24.

2017, and the plan was to pretend they were actually going

have that budget meeting, but instead they would notify Mr. Hawes about his termination.

May 2,

0f

WPT asking the CFO of his company to

Mr. Hawes in WPT’S small Boise ofﬁce for the better part 0f eight years.
284,

secret for a couple

Boise to communicate the decision t0 Mr. Hawes (and the paralegal 0f

legal department as well).

telephone calls with

Tn,

t0

him

t0 give

in-house legal

Mr. Hawes of this decision

inexplicably decided t0 keep

weeks While they worked out a speciﬁc plan on how

travel

tell

its

2019, p. 90,

For his

part,

ll.

Tic,

3-8.

Mr. Hawes had no idea he was about

would be a budget meeting and wanted

Hawes asked Mr. Lightner for some

to prepare for

it.

to

be terminated but expected there

Tn, April 30, 2019, p. 1 I I,

ll.

1-12.

Mr.

information t0 prepare for the budget meeting and spent about

an hour and a half getting ready to attend the budget meeting. Tn, April

10

30, 2019, p. I I I,

ll.

I 7-

20.

As soon

as the meeting started, however, the

was

actual reason for the meeting

meaning

a proposed severance agreement 0f three months’ salary and Mr.

Hawes immediately

this is

18.

l.

agreement. Tn,

to

that day.

Tn, April 30, 2019, p. 1 12,

go look

You need

recalls that

May 2,

indicating that “Yeah, you’re done.

t0 get

your stuff today.” Tn, April

12-13.

Tr.,

Mr.

April 30,

We have cut

30, 2019, p. I 12,

ll.

20-22.

Mr. Hawes did suggest a 100k in his personnel ﬁle for a severance
ll.

16-25; p. 297,

ﬁnd an unsigned but

May 2,

subject severance term. Tn,

ll.

in his personnel ﬁle for his severance agreement.

2019, p. 296,

personnel ﬁle Where he did

ll.

severance agreement.” Tn, April 30, 2019, p. 112,

They responded by partially

off all your passwords.

Mr. Lightner also

my

not

them

instructed

2019, p. 1 I2,

G.

Mr. Hawes 0f his employment being terminated,

They provided Mr.

responded “N0

Hawes

from Pittsburgh informed Mr. Hawes the

3-6.

effective immediately,

Hawes with

t0 notify

CFO

for

1-5.

Mr. Lightner did check Mr. Hawes’

nevertheless written agreement that included the

2019, p. 298,

Mr. Hawes was In-House Counsel

ll.

ll.

6-24.

WPT for All 12 Years 0f Emplovment

Mr. Hawes summarized his 12 years of employment and

Who he worked

for as follows:

Q. What was your position when you walked through the
doors on August 1, 2005, and then When you left in January 0f20 1 7?

A. When I walked in on August 1“, I was general counsel
Western Paciﬁc Timber. And then I walked into that ofﬁce on
January 10 [2017] When I walked in, I was general counsel for
Western Paciﬁc Timber.
for

Tn, April 30, 2019, p. I 13,
in

WPT’S

ll.

I 7-24.

WPT’S

controller,

who worked side-by-side With Mr. Hawes

small Boise ofﬁce for the better part 0f eight years, also testiﬁed 0n behalf 0f

he had n0 reason

at all to disagree

Q. Well,

With Mr.

I’ll

Hawes

represent t0

in this regard:

you

that

Andy testiﬁed here

in this

he was general counsel for Western Paciﬁc Timber When
he walked in the door in August 0f 2005 and when he had t0 walk
trial that

out the door in January 0f 2017.

D0 you have

any reason

t0 disagree With that?

11

WPT that

A. N0.
Tn,

May 2,

2019, p. 275,

ll.

I

d0

not.

19-25;]9. 276,

ll.

1-3 (emphasis added).

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

III.

The Appellant’s coverage 0f

the

course 0f proceedings does provide an accurate

chronology 0fthe proceedings below. The coverage, however, raises a couple of important factual
points that deserve

some

attention.

The Counterclaims

A.

The Defendant made two counterclaims
count alleged Mr.

Hawes had breached

during the 2012 transition phase.

ﬁduciary duties owed t0

Hawes

integrity.

Complaint by Mr. Hawes. One

a Conﬁdentiality Agreement he had signed With

and amounted

These were very serious accusations against Mr.

0n

to a public assault

The Appellant treats these counterclaims

his professional character

rather dismissively

on

this appeal, saying

that the counterclaims “are not at issue in this appeal.” Appellant’s Brief at I 0.

fair

That

is

and
only

neither

nor accurate.

At the very
the

WPT

The second count alleged that Mr. Hawes had breached

R., p. 5.

WPT in multiple ways.

as a professional

in response t0 the

least, the

defense 0f both counterclaims by counsel representing Mr.

employment claim was very much a

fees,

part 0f the District Court’s decision t0

Which the Appellant has made a speciﬁc issue 0n appeal. This

is

also over

Hawes 0n

award attorney’s

and above the

fact

that the counterclaims played a very signiﬁcant role in this litigation, particularly given the

seriousness 0f the accusations being

There was a

lot

made

of discovery and

against an attorney

0n the public record

litigation relating directly to the ﬁrst

alleged breach 0f the Conﬁdentiality Agreement.

hearing, the trial court provided oral guidance

Aug, pp.

5-6.

At

0n how she was going

12

the

in

open

court.

counterclaim for the

summary judgment

to deal

With the various

On the breach of conﬁdentiality counterclaim,

motions.

a claim with only nominal damages go forward.

Aug,

to dismiss that counterclaim.

all

came down

to alleging that

values 0f certain lands

WPT,

6, If

I8.

Shortly thereafter,

substantial discovery

on

this

WPT agreed

claim revealed that

WPT and somehow drove down the price 0f that land,

was never even

the defense could not prove Mr.

to

The

6.

p.

let

it

Mr. Hawes had somehow used conﬁdential information about land

owned by

in reality the subject land

p.

Aug,

Judge Baskin indicated she would not

sold. R., p. 1386.

The bottom

although

line was, beside the fact

Hawes used any conﬁdential information for any purpose adverse

they could not prove any kind 0f damages either. Aug, p.

6, If

I9.

WPT initially requested that part of the stipulation to dismiss the counterclaim be that each
party

p. 6,

would bear

If

20.

their

own respective

The Conﬁdentiality Agreement

on any claim

arising

from

it

Aug,

attorney’s fees and costs in dealing with that claim.

in question

to recover attorney fees.

had a provision allowing a prevailing party

The

Plaintiff accordingly insisted that the

Stipulation for Dismissal provide the parties “expressly reserve their right t0 seek attorney’s fees

and costs

at the

stipulation.”

trial

court’s

appropriate stage of this action With respect to the Counterclaim dismissed

Aug,

p. 6.

The Order 0f Dismissal

award 0f attorney

fees,

0f discovery and

litigation,

of this counterclaim

for breach

and the

R., p. 845.

In appealing the

trial

Mr. Hawes had used a public relations

at the

very

least.

of ﬁduciary duties also involved a substantial amount

court allowed that claim t0 be decided

counterclaim alleged multiple breaches 0f ﬁduciary duty.

ﬁrm

that

It

actually

by

the jury.

came down t0 one claim

had been hired by

WPT

for his

own

beneﬁt and use While running for Boise City Council. This was notwithstanding the
public relations

ﬁrm had

submitted

this

WPT ignores the fact that Mr. Hawes was undeniably entitled

t0 recover attorney fees for the defense

The second counterclaim

also so provided.

by

bills to

WPT completely separate

13

and apart from

The
that

personal

fact that the

bills t0

Mr.

Hawes. At the close 0f evidence, the
counterclaim.

Tn,

May

“scrawny and doesn’t

3,

settle

2019, p.

74,

l.

Tr.,

May 3,

made an
The

14.

very well because

amount that he had not paid.”
“it’s

Plaintiff

I

oral

trial

motion for directed verdict 0n

court remarked that the claim looked

expected t0 see proof that there was a speciﬁc

2019, p.

77,

l.

At the

I 4.

end, the Court ruled that while

about as marginal as you can get,” he allowed the claim to go t0 the jury. Tn,

p. 79,

l.

I.

A

Form was submitted

separate Special Verdict

this

to the jury

on

this

May 3,

2019,

counterclaim and

the jury unanimously rejected the claim. R., pp. 12-13.

The Summary Judgment Hearing and Oral Contract Claim

B.

Appellant argues counsel for the Respondent took a “new position 0n the breach 0f contract
claim” t0 the effect that the alleged agreement was both written and

11,

2018.”

Appellant’s Brief at II.

motion included an argument

WPT

said:

earlier, the

that the oral contract claim

the basis 0f the statute of frauds.

agreement,

Four months

“Thus,

After arguing there

we

Hawes $500,000

in severance after

was ﬁled on June

26, 20 1 8, almost exactly four

statute

R.,

for

summary judgment
on

was no written and signed employment

WPT

ﬁve years 0f work.”

was new. The motion

Appellant’s

hearing 0f October

the Plaintiff should be dismissed

are left With, at best, Mr.

agreement was established in 2005 between him and

contract claim

by

oral, at the

Hawes’ contention

providing that

R., p.

WPT

that

an oral

would pay Mr.

288 (emphasis added). That brief

months before Appellant’s counsel argued the

summary judgment 0n the

oral contract claim

of frauds defense was denied two separate times. Tn, October

1 1,

2018 atp.

oral

based 0n a

43,

ll.

5-13;

1205.

IV.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

The Respondent, Mr. Hawes,

is

entitled t0

an additional award 0f attorney’s fees 0n

appeal, pursuant t0 LC. § 45-615(2) and/or LC. § 12-121.

14

this

ARGUMENT

V.

The Appellant identiﬁes
There

is

six speciﬁc issues presented

on appeal.1 Appellant’s Briefat

a substantial overlap in the majority of issues identiﬁed by the Appellant because they

pertain directly to the sufﬁciency of the evidence to support the

for Directed Verdict and/or t0 support the jury’s

A.

8.

The

unanimous

trial

court’s denial 0f the

Motion

verdict.

Trial Court’s Denial 0f Motion for Directed Verdict

The Appellant

correctly states that the standard of review

directed verdict requires the appellate court apply the

originally ruling

on the motion. Sea,

534 (2012). The Appellant does
motion for directed verdict

not,

e.g.,

Enriquez

however,

in the ﬁrst place.

One Who moves

v.

from the denial 0f a motion

same standard

as the trial court

for

when

Idaho Power C0., 152 Idaho 563, 272 P.3d

fairly address standards that

apply t0 ruling 0n a

Such standards are extremely well

established:

for directed verdict pursuant t0 I.R.C.P. 50(a)

thereby admits the truth of the adverse evidence and every inference
that

may legitimately be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable

to the
is

opposing party. Such a motion should not be granted

if there

substantial evidence to justify submitting the case t0 the jury.

‘Substantial’

evidence

uncontradicted evidence.

however,

not,

is
It

is

enough

synonymous

with

that the evidence is

0f

sufﬁcient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could

conclude that a verdict in favor of a party against

was made
Stephens

v.

is

Whom the motion

proper.

Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 252-253, 678 P.2d 41 (1984). In this case there were actually

four separate rulings

by two judges

to the effect that there

was sufﬁcient evidence

to justify

submitting the case t0 the jury. The original District Court judge on this case, the Honorable Nancy

Baskin, ruled 0n

summary judgment,

that

based 0n the factual record,

1

it

was possible “with

the

The Appellant’s Amended Notice 0f Appeal identiﬁed more than twice this number 0f issues
they are appealing. However, Appellant’s brief makes it clear there are six speciﬁc issues before
this Court.

15

jury making reasonable inferences that there

October
the

I 1, 2018, p. 42,

ll.

22-24.

The

summary judgment motion some

same

ruling yet again

was an

0n WPT’S Motion

agreement between the parties.”

Court made

District

six

oral

months

later.

this point in writing

R., p.

I204.

t0 Reconsider, basically

ll.

ruling

0n

Judge Baskin then made the

ﬁnding

that there

evidence t0 submit the case to the jury 0n the oral contract claim. Tn, April
25; p. I I 0,

When

Tn,

9,

was sufﬁcient

2019, p. I 09,

ll.

1 6-

1-24. Then, after the Plaintiff s close 0f evidence, trial Judge Schroederz speciﬁcally

ruled:

There

evidence that the parties reached a

is

speciﬁc

agreement orally as to the duration of time and the amount 0f
compensation in the event that there was a termination 0f

employment. There is sufﬁcient evidence t0 g0 the jury, and the
arguments made might be more persuasive t0 the jury, but that Will
be

their chore, t0 analyze the

them
Tn,

May

2,

2019, p. I49,

testimony alone

is

law and apply the

facts as they

heard

in the evidence.

ll.

9-18.

What Judge Schroeder

was exactly

said

right.

Mr. Hawes’

more than sufﬁcient to survive a directed verdict motion. The standard in ruling

on the directed verdict motion requires accepting Mr. Hawes’ testimony
point blank testimony that there

was a meeting 0f the minds on

as true. This includes the

the three essential terms reached

With the owner of WPT that included the subj ect severance agreement:
Q. So was the deal struck
A. Yes.

at this

meeting?

Q. What were the essential terms? Tell the jury.
A. That I would receive a salary of $ 1 00,000, and then the severance

agreement that

I

described, and then that

I

could continue

my work

with the Idaho State Bar.
Q. Who was that agreement with?
A. Western Paciﬁc Timber.

2

Judge Schroeder took over as

trial

judge shortly before the

in her trial schedule.

16

trial,

as

Judge Baskin had a conﬂict

Tn, April 30, 2019, p. 50,

ll.

I -I 0.

Accepting

this

the directed verdict, as Judge Schroeder ruled.

presented at

trial that

supports Mr.

testimony as

true, as required,

In addition, there

Hawes testimony

precludes granting

was abundantly more evidence

in this regard.

The Jurv’s Verdict was Supported BV Substantial Competent Evidence

B.

WPT

next seeks t0 set aside the jury’s unanimous verdict based upon a purported

insufﬁciency 0f substantial and competent evidence.

Court 0n
their

this issue, basically

WPT appealed directly to the Idaho Supreme

asking the appellate court t0 second guess the unanimous jury and

ﬁndings 0f fact. They did not ﬁle a motion for

JNOV

nor any other post-trial motion that

related t0 the sufﬁciency 0f the evidence t0 support the jury’s verdict.

Standard 0f Review

1.

WPT

again provides very minimal coverage 0f the standard 0f review 0n this issue.

Appellant’s Briefat I9.

This bare-bones coverage ignores a number of important aspects t0 the

applicable standard 0f review in trying to set aside a jury verdict

evidence, Which are extremely well established in Idaho.

in a

2016

0n the grounds of insufﬁcient

These were summarized by

this

Court

decision:

This Court Will not set aside a jury verdict 0n appeal if it is
supported by substantial and competent evidence. When reviewing
a jury verdict 0n appeal the evidence adduced at trial is construed in

evidence supporting the jury’s

Who prevailed at trial. The
verdict may be contradicted, but the

verdict Will be upheld if

is

a light most favorable t0 the party

it

of such sufﬁcient quantity and

probative value that reasonable minds could conclude that the
verdict 0f the jury

was proper. This Court Will not second guess

the

jury’s determinations as t0 the weight 0f the evidence and witness
credibility.

Ballard

v.

Kerr, 160 Idaho 674, 686, 378 P.3d 464 (2016) (citations omitted). This Court has also

deﬁned what
reasonable

is

meant by

“substantial evidence” in this context as “relevant evidence as a

mind might accept

t0 support a conclusion;

17

it is

more than a

scintilla,

but less than a

preponderance.” See,

e.g.,

State

Roll, 142 Idaho 117, 124 P.3d

462 (2003). The maxim

v.

Bennett, 142 Idaho 166, 125 P.3d 522 (2005);

993 (2005); Hoskins

v.

“second guess the jury’s determinations

and witness credibility” applies with particular force here. The

arguments made by the Appellant here were the same arguments
avoid

legal obligation, but the jury

its

The

2.

unanimously rejected

n0

oral

WPT made t0 the jury t0 try t0

their factual arguments.

Trial Evidence Established the Severance

Ignoring Mr. Hawes’ direct testimony t0 the contrary,
that

Agreement Was Made

WPT argues “the evidence was clear

agreement was ever reached 0n severance.” Appellant’s Briefat 25. The Appellant

then provides a very distorted portrayal 0f the evidence presented at
bits

and pieces 0f the evidence presented

were not

at trial,

but

it

ignores

all

trial

on this

agreement.

It

selects

of the contrary evidence as

with,

WPT

ignores Virtually

all

0f Mr. Hawes’ testimony about

That testimony standing alone would

if

it

this

severance

exceed the standard of substantial and

far

competent evidence requiring the unanimous jury verdict be upheld. There

t0

subj ect.

there.

To begin

that

v.

CircleA Coast, Ina, 138 Idaho 336, 63 P.3d

that the appellate court will not

as t0 the weight 0f the evidence

Marchbanks

Mr. Hawes’ testimony over several days 0n the stand does not

exist.

is

n0 basis

to pretend

WPT several times refers

Mr. Hawes’ testimony as “self—serving,” but that does not justify ignoring the substance 0f his

testimony 0r provide a legal basis t0 overturn a unanimous jury verdict.
credibility,

and as reﬂected

in Justice Schroeder’s ruling

0n attorney’s

The jury evaluated

fees, the

his

Court concurred

with them.
In addition t0 Mr.

established

As he

Why this

Hawes’

explicit testimony regarding the deal reached, his testimony also

generous severance provision was

explained, he had joined the

Elam

& Burke

18

made

ﬁrm

to

a part 0f his employment agreement.

become

their real estate specialist

and

he had by then established a very good book ofbusiness, and
p. 24,

for

ll.

7-22.

When Mr.

Blixseth

WPT, Mr. Hawes “pushed

made

the ﬁrst offer to Mr.

it

was growing. Tn, April

Hawes

to

would make no sense

it

up the book 0f business he had developed over a decade’s worth 0f real

ll.

deal.

business with an uncertain future.

Tic,

estate

for

him

substantially t0 Mr.

April 30, 2019, p. 46,

Tr.,

Hawes’ favor 0n the back end 0f the deal

April 30, 2019, p. 47,

sense that Mr.

ll.

Hawes would not

I 7-24.

The

trial

ll.

salary under these circumstances.

October

that

ll.

had any kind of reasonable answer

t0

would

end 0f the

common

court recognized this basic point 0f

II, 2019, p. 42,

Tr.,

at this

23-25; p. 47,

rather than the front

likely leave his private practice for nothing

to give

work t0 work

Mr. Blixseth understood and for that reason he offered the severance package

1-8.

work

become in-house counsel

back” because the salary offer was about the same as Mr. Hawes

could reasonably expect in private practice that year, and

new venture/startup

30, 2019,

more than

the

same

1-5.

WPT has

the ﬁrst written

document

24-25; p. 43,

ll.

never had an answer t0 this point.

WPT has
after the oral

term, if

it

also never

agreement was reached

at the

dinner meeting included this very large dollar ﬁgure

had not been part of the agreement already reached

Plaintiff’s Exhibit 6, a letter dated July 8,

Why

2005, with Mr.

Hawes

at the

dinner meeting.

seeking t0

already made, speciﬁcally including the severance agreement provision.

that

Mr. Hawes would write

term
t0

if it in fact

this directly t0

Mr. Blixseth and include

had not been part 0f the agreement already reached. And,

deﬁes

There

is

we

sense

this letter

I

was attached

believe reﬂects

discussed.” Plaintiﬁ’iv Exhibit 7 (emphasis added).

also the testimony 0f

served as kind 0f the right-hand

common

very large dollar ﬁgure

an email from Mr. Hawes which said “[p]lease ﬁnd attached an outline which

our employment terms Which

is

conﬁrm the agreement

It

this

This

man

Mr. Patrick Ratte,

Who was

Mr. Blixseth.

May

for

19

T14,

I,

the controller for

2019, p. I38,

ll.

BGI, who

9-18.

WPT

addresses Mr. Ratte’s testimony rather dismissively, but in actuality his testimony

Much

important for a number of reasons.

that

he had an understanding through

these communications that Mr. Blixseth had in fact entered into the

that included the severance provision.

Mr. Ratte also testiﬁed t0 understanding

Tn,

May

I,

that the severance

because Mr. Hawes was giving up his private practice.

Mr. Ratte was also directly involved

Tic,

In that form Mr.

2019, p. 153,

l.

25; p. I54,

May

1,

2019, p. I 66,

the following:

employment agreement by and between Mr. Blixseth and Mr. Hawes

also dated July 21, 2005,

On

the

at

Will form

it

agreement regarding employment.

Plaintiﬁ’iv Exhibit 12.

like to

t0

Mr. Hawes

that

May 3,
stating:

t0

and

Mr. Ratte,

as follows:

n0 other
I

me know if you

handle this differently.

Mr. Ratte testiﬁed that he was aware that the hiring 0f Mr. Hawes “wasn’t

just an ordinary hiring process like

the side.” Tn,

Plaintiff’s

noted on the form

that the statement is subj ect to that agreement. Let

would

Hawes

As you may know Tim and
I

See

relating t0 certain terms

states here there is

negotiated a separate employment agreement.

18-24.

ll.

“*Subject t0 that certain

Where Mr. Hawes explains the handwritten notation

Employment

1-5.

Mr. Hawes signing the

This was accompanied by an email from Mr.

conditions 0f employment.”

ll.

agreement had been reached was

in circumstances surrounding

Hawes hand wrote

all

employment agreement With

standard employee at—will form, which has an important bearing 0n this issue.

Exhibit 11.

quite

of the correspondence or writings between Mr. Hawes

and Mr. Blixseth went through Mr. Ratte. He conﬁrmed

Mr. Hawes

was

2019, p. I 70,

most employees,
ll.

3-5.

Also in

that there

was an employment agreement 0n

Plaintiff’s Exhibit 12 is

Mr. Ratte’s response

“Your notation 0n the Employment at Will form is ﬁne.” Mr. Ratte testiﬁed

he would never have written that response unless speciﬁc approval t0 do so came from Mr.

Blixseth himself. Tn,

May 3,

2019, p. 170,

agreed that his response t0 Mr.

ll.

Hawes meant

22-25;p. I71,

it

l.

I;p. 182,

ll.

4-14.

was company approved. Tn, May

20

And, Mr. Ratte
3,

2019, p. I 71,

ll.

2-4.

He

further indicated that he understood that

was a reference

been negotiated between Mr. Blixseth and Mr. Hawes

May 3,

2019, p. I73,

ll.

1-4;

ll.

to the speciﬁc terms that

had

that included this severance agreement. Tr.,

14-1 7.

WPT repeatedly argues the written exchanges between Mr. Hawes and either Mr. Blixseth
0r Mr. Ratte following the dinner meeting

WPT

already reached.

agreement. In
contract.

fact,

acknowledges

somehow

that

affects the validity

0f the agreement that was

none of these documents amount

to

an employment

WPT obtained a summary dismissal of any claim these documents formed the

That being the case, the only possible agreement that could exist between

Hawes had to be

that agreed

upon

n0 agreement

arguing there

is

straight years

would 0f course

at the

dinner meeting in June 2005. Otherwise,

The

at all.

fact

Mr. Hawes actually went

t0

work

WPT and Mr.

WPT would be
for

WPT for

12

eviscerate that argument.

WPT also ignores the fact that none 0f these writings did anything at all t0 change 0r even
try t0

change any of the three essential terms 0f the agreement that had been reached

meeting (the

salary, the severance

agreement provision, and Mr. Hawes’ continued service as

Idaho State Bar Commissioner). There

and

dinner

at the

is

not one word in any 0f the writings between Mr.

Hawes

WPT after this dinner meeting that had any effect on any of these three essential terms.

And,

these writings consistently acknowledged the existence of the severance agreement provisions.

Here again,

it

would make n0 sense

for

Mr. Hawes

t0

be repeatedly injecting

this

very serious

ﬁnancial term throughout these writings, without some push back. And, there was not one iota of

evidence indicating

WPT or anyone at WPT had any obj ection to Mr. Hawes referencing this term.

In fact, Mr. Ratte point blank testiﬁed that Mr. Blixseth never obj ected t0 the severance agreement.

Tr.,

May 3,

2019, p. 168,

ll.

8—10.

21

Further corroboration of the existence of the severance agreement

was

in the testimony

of

Mrs. Hawes. Mr. Hawes reported the agreement reached to his Wife, including the terms of the
severance agreement, right after the dinner meeting.

Hawes conﬁrmed her husband came home
the

employment agreement, including

129,

ll.

20—25; p. 130,

1-10.

ll.

At

May

Tic,

after the dinner

and on

2019, p. 121,

14-24.

ll.

Mrs.

meeting and told her about the terms 0f

the severance, and she

trial,

1,

was

“elated.”

WPT

this appeal,

Tic,

argues Mrs.

May

3,

2019, p.

Hawes was not

present at the dinner meeting and therefore had no personal knowledge of the severance agreement

being reached. However,

When she was asked about this

at trial

she responded that ifthe severance

agreement had not been reached then her husband “must be a really good actor.” Tn,
p. I 32,

l.

She explained

I 4.

her about

it

that for her

husband

t0 just

make up

this

May 3,

severance agreement and

minutes after the meeting took place was unrealistic and made n0 sense.

2019, p. I33,

ll.

20-25.

Applying the well-established standard

inferences are construed in favor of the

least further corroborative

non-moving

party, Mrs.

201 9,

that all facts

and

all

Hawes’ testimony

Tr.,

tell

May

3,

reasonable

is at

the very

of the severance agreement having been conclusively reached

at the

dinner meeting.

In

summary,

far

from there being a lack 0f substantial competent evidence

existence 0f the severance agreement, the

to support

Mr. Hawes’ Emplover was

That
is

evidence provided a veritable mountain of evidence

it.

3.

verdict

trial

t0 support the

WPT

is

doing nothing more than just asking

illustrated again

never denied any

WPT

by

its

this

Court to second-guess the jury

arguments that Mr. Hawes’ employer was not

opportunity to introduce any evidence

22

it

felt

was contrary

WPT.
to

WPT was

Mr. Hawes or

supportive of

its

position,

and

it

was not denied any opportunity

t0 argue

attempts to just re-argue the same points based on the same evidence

The defense

make much 0f

tried t0

employment agreement
Mr. Hawes explained

in writing indicated the proposed

at the

rej ected

for the jury.

by

WPT

the jury.

Hawes’ attempts

t0 get a signed

employer was The Blixseth Group. As

however, the only reason he did

at trial,

Because

the point that Mr.

it

that:

dinner conversation, Tim, or Mr. Blixseth, stated

1

Western Paciﬁc Timber’s in-house counsel, but
also stated that from time t0 time, I would be doing other projects
for other entities that he owned.

would be hired

Tn, April 30, 2019, p. 60,

ll.

as

I 7-22

(emphasis added). The controller for BGI, and Mr. Blixseth’s

right-hand man, likewise testiﬁed that Mr.
services to

WPT,

but also t0 other

ignores this testimony.

entities, as

become in-house counsel

for

WPT only;

to

become in-house counsel

for

WPT; and

served as in-house counsel for

counsel for

needed.

was markedly

(3) for the entirety

for

13-20.

ll.

(1)

was

WPT

recruited

of his 12 years of working there he

ll.

that

99%

16-24.

of his work was as acting in-house

Then,

WPT

0n cross—examination.” Appellant ’s Briefat

the travels he did, primarily in the ﬁrst couple 0f years of working.

testimony of Mr.

2019, p. I58,

WPT.

Tn, April 30, 2019, p. 85,

different

May 2,

job offer that was made and accepted was

(2) that the

acknowledges Mr. Hawes testiﬁed

WPT.

Tic,

in-house counsel, providing legal

WPT also ignores the testimony by Mr. Hawes that he:

t0

WPT

Hawes was WPT’S

Hawes where he explained that even While he was

claims:

28.

“Hawes’ testimony

They g0 0n

But,

WPT

travelling

t0 talk about

again ignores the

0n one-off projects

Yellowstone World, for example, that he would travel With Mr. Blixseth and they would

conduct

WPT business while 0n the road.

Tn, April 30, 2019, p. I 72,

ll.

20-23. Mr.

Hawes

also

testiﬁed that during these travels “I never stopped being general counsel for Western Paciﬁc

Timber.” Tn, April 30, 2019, p. I 73,

ll.

3-4.

Mr. Hawes further testiﬁed

23

that

he also travelled

extensively for reasons exclusively associated with Western Paciﬁc Timber. Tn,

1 06,

ll.

WPT also ignores Mr.

1 1-15.

Hawes’ testimony

months 0f employment, he

maybe ﬁve,

outside 0f the U.S.

18-month period
2019, p. 1 07,

Hawes

that

2-6.

ll.

I

did

six

some

Regarding

weeks during

this ﬁrst

counsel. For approximately

“during that period 0f time, Iprobably travelled

testiﬁed:

transactional

2019, p.

I,

summarized the amount 0f travel he

was always WPT’S in-house

did in the context 0f addressing that he

the ﬁrst 18

that

May

that entire time.

work

for

So you’re looking

Yellowstone Club World.”

at

about an

Tr.,

couple of years, and the amount 0f work for

May

1,

WPT, Mr.

testiﬁed 0n cross-examination:

Q. Yeah. So you have testiﬁed today that you did work for Western
Paciﬁc Timber: correct?

A. Correct.
Q.

And that that was the

vast majority? Ithink

you

said 99 percent

0f the work?
A. During

my entire tenure With the company.

Q. What would you say was
A. Iwould say 90 percent.
Tn, April 30, 201 9, p. I 52,
as

ll.

the percentage

I I -20. This hardly

amounts

t0

from 2005

t0

2007?

being “markedly different” testimony,

WPT claims.
In addition,

“consistent wit

”

WPT goes to the length of citing the testimony oftwo other employees as being

Mr. Hawes doing more work for non-WPT

entities.

They speciﬁcally quote

testimony of WPT’S controller, John Lightner, and what he understood about what Mr.
travelling 0r doing. Appellant ’s Briefat 29.

acknowledged:

(1)

the

Hawes was

WPT ignores that Mr. Lightner on cross—examination

he was not keeping track of what days Mr. Hawes was gone 0r was in the

Boise Ofﬁce back in 2005; (2) he was not keeping track 0f What hours Mr. Hawes was working for

any particular

entity; (3)

he wasn’t paying attention

doing; and (4) he has n0 idea

WPT or not.

Tn,

May 2,

t0

what

legal

work Mr. Hawes was

When Mr. Hawes was on the road travelling

2019, p. 272,

ll.

2-23. Mr. Lightner,

24

Who was

if he

called

actually

was doing work

for

by WPT and worked

with Mr.

Hawes

in the small Boise

understood that Mr.

ll.

Hawes was

general counsel for

And, he had no reason

1 7-20.

counsel for

WPT

ofﬁce for the better part 0f eight years, testiﬁed that he himself

at all to disagree that

from the time he walked

into the

shown the way out 0f WPT’S doors 12 years
21-25;p. 276,

ll.

WPT

later in

WPT

at all times.

Tn,

May

2,

2019, p. 275,

Mr. Hawes was employed as in-house
doors in August 0f 2005 until he was

January 0f 2017. Tn,

May 2,

2019, p. 275,

ll.

1-3.

Also ignored by Appellant on this subj ect

and Mr. Blixseth’s right—hand man, who was
and WPT’S sole owner

the testimony 0f Mr. Ratte, controller for

is

in the

after the dinner meeting.

BGI,

middle 0f communications between Mr. Hawes

Mr. Ratte repeatedly testiﬁed Mr. Hawes was

employed by WPT:

D0 you have an understanding ofwhether he

Q.
t0

[Hawes] was going

be working for Western Paciﬁc Timber?

A. That was

my understanding, yes.
* * *

Well, d0 you agree that he

Q.

[ML Hawes] was an employee of

Western Paciﬁc Timber?
A. Yes,
Tn,

May 2,

2019, p. I65,

testiﬁed that Mr.

amounts

d0.

ll.

20-23; p. I84,

ll.

21-23.

Hawes was employed by WPT.

to substantial

In

I

The

controllers for

m

BGI and WPT

WPT ignores this testimony although

it

clearly

competent evidence corroborating that Mr. Hawes was employed by

summary, any

fair

review 0f a_ll 0f the evidence produced

at trial, particularly

thus

WPT.

When

it is

being done With a View 0f construing that evidence in a light most favorable t0 Mr. Hawes,
conclusively reveals there

unanimous verdict
C.

The Jurv

was more than

substantial

competent evidence

t0 support the jury’s

in this case.

Instruction Issue

WPT next appeals from the trial court’s denial 0f their motion for a new trial based upon a
single issue of

how

the Court responded t0 a question posed

25

by

the jury While deliberating.

Speciﬁcally, the jury wrote a note during deliberations asking:

“What

is

the legal point at

which a

company or entity becomes a person’s employer?” After a substantial exchange between the Court
and counsel over various proposed responses, the Court

“The

legal point

of employment

is

There are two responses to

when

1.

With the agreed upon response:

the parties agree.”

this issue:

for appeal, and/or (2) the response given

settled

(1) Appellant did not object

was not

error

and preserve the issue

and certainly does not justify a new

trial.

The Defendant Did Not Obiect

WPT makes n0 mention at all 0f there being a signiﬁcant issue as t0 Whether WPT agreed
with the proposed response 0r failed t0 timely obj ect and preserve the issue for appeal.
is

a hotly contested issue as

their objection.

was and

WPT well knows.

For a party t0 claim they were prejudiced by an error in the
instruction, Idaho

It

law requires

that they

make

way a trial

court handled a jury

a timely objection and explain the reasoning for

Rule 5 1(i)(3) of the Idaho Rules 0f Civil Procedure speciﬁcally provides as

follows:

Obj ections. N0 party may
give

assign as error the giving of or failure to

an instruction unless the party obj ects before the jury

deliberates, stating distinctly the instruction t0

objects

Which

that party

and the grounds of the objection.

[R.C.P. 51 (i)(3). That same standard applies 0n appeal as well:

A party cannot raise an issue on appeal that relates to the giving of
a jury instruction that misstates the law unless the party timely
obj ected t0 the speciﬁc instruction

on the record,

stating the

grounds

0f the objection.
Hojj’er

v.

Shappard, 160 Idaho 868, 875, n.2, 380 P.3d 681 (2016); Bolognese

857, 867, n.6, 292 P.3d 248 (2012).

The Defendant cannot

26

v.

Forte, 153 Idaho

satisfy the requirement

of having raised

a timely objection t0 the

way the Court answered the jury’s question and certainly failed to provide

any kind 0f “distinct” grounds for such an objection.
a part of the record that reveals defense counsel objecting to one of the

First, there is

speciﬁc proposals
Tn,

deliberations.

is

made on how

May 3,

to

respond t0 the question posed by the jury during their

2019, p. 181,

ll.

1 0-19.

But, the court did not give that response, and

accordingly not in controversy here. Thus, while

of the exchange, they were

n_ot t0

the response that

After the above exchange, defense counsel
the jury question “what

employer?” She

is

the legal point at

it

WPT did raise objections during the early part
was

actually given.

made

a speciﬁc proposal

which a company 0r

entity

0n how

t0

respond t0

becomes a person’s

said:

MS. GRASHAM: What if we say: The legal point 0f
employment is When the parties agree. You must determine that
point based on the concepts 0f contract law that have been provided

Because they are entering into an employment relationship
and that is different than just any other relationship because you
have certain obligations once you are an employee.
t0 you.

Tn,

May 3,

the ﬁrst

is

2019, p. 182,

ll.

10-1 6 (emphasis added). In context, defense counsel was suggesting

two sentences of the quote above be the actual answer to give the jury. The

third sentence

an attempted explanation 0f Why those ﬁrst two sentences should be the answer. In any event,

the speciﬁc proposal

employment

m.

is

Tn,

when

May

3,

by defense counsel opened with

the parties agree.” This

2019, p. I84,

Court’s eventual response that

ll.

22-23.

was given

is

the sentence:

the exact instruction that

“The

was ultimately given

Not only did defense counsel

to the jury,

it

was a

part of

legal point

fail t0

0f
to

object t0 the

What the Defendant

itself

proposed to give the jury as the response, using the exact same words.

The

transcript then

shows defense counsel again agreeing With What turned out

actual response given t0 the jury’s question.

This time the proposal was

27

made

t0

be the

t0 provide just a

one sentence response that word for word mimics the ﬁrst sentence 0f the Defendant’s proposed
response quoted above. The pertinent exchange provides:

MR. JANIS:

I

know we have

all

these hypotheticals about

guy and all that, but What if you iust say: ‘The legal point of
employment is when the parties agree.’
THE COURT: That’s what I said.
MR. JANIS: And then cutout the rest.
THE COURT: So just send back: The legal point of
employment is when the parties agree?
sick

MS. GRASHAM: Mutuallv

MR. JANIS:

Fine by us.

answer, that’s the only one
think

Tn,

May

3,

it’s

“The

“mutually”

2019, p. I83,

legal point 0f

is

May as well. We’ve

got t0 get an

we are going t0 get agreement 0n.

Idon’t

controversial.

l.

I5 — p. I84,

response, but proposed t0 add the one

read:

agree. Yeah.

I

l.

(emphasis added).

word “mutually”

employment

is

when

t0

it.

WPT

counsel agreed With this

This would have

the parties mutually agree.”

redundant and unnecessary. The more important point

is

made

Adding

given the jury.

It

was

response was what

words,

it is

an actual agreement With

for that reason the statements

it

word

It is

not just a

proposed response, the response

by Mr. Hawes’ counsel

could “get agreement 0n” and that

we

this

the

defense counsel otherwise

agreed t0 respond t0 the juror’s question with saying “when the parties agree.”
failure to obj ect in other

the sentence

was not even

that the

one sentence

“controversial”

was not

challenged in any way.

The following was

the next and ﬁnal exchange before the response

was speciﬁcally given

to the jury:

THE COURT: On the record.
Here’s what
jury:

What

is

we have.

A question has been submitted by the

the legal point at

Which a company or

entity

becomes

a person’s employer?

Answer: The legal point 0f employment

is

when the

agree.

Any objection?
MR. JANIS: We’ll

accept that, your Honor.

28

parties

MS. GRASHAM:
Tn,

May 3,

2019, p. 184,

l.

19 — p. 185,

Yes, your Honor.

l.

(emphasis added). Nothing more was

I

said.

Id.

By

responding in the afﬁrmative, defense counsel indicated the proposed response was acceptable to
the defense as well.

It

was not an

Certainly no grounds at

all

There was no objection being raised

objection.

provided for any kind 0f objection. In

fact,

it

was

at this point.

the third time the

Defendant indicated agreement with answering the jury by saying the legal point 0f employment
is

When

the parties agree. In any event,

answer t0 be given

to the jury

and

it

was

clear at this point this

at that point is

was

the court’s ruling

when defense counsel was

0n the

required t0 clearly

object.

The Defendant not only

failed t0 properly object t0 the

given t0 the jury, but in fact agreed With

it.

The

failure t0

proposed response before

make

it

was

a distinct obj ection and explain

Chapman

v.

Chapman, 147 Idaho 756, 215 P.3d 476 (2009) (saying Rule 51 “requires a speciﬁc objection

t0

the grounds for the objection

the jury instructions”).

in

is fatal t0

The Defendant

law as grounds for a new

the Appellant challenging

at this point

it

now.

See, e.g.,

cannot properly claim this as any kind of error

trial.

The trial judge likewise understood that WPT’S counsel had agreed with the response given
to the jury. In ruling

on the motion

for

new trial on this

issue, the

Court indicated

deny the motion on the substantive merits, but nevertheless commented:
agreement.” Tn, June 20, 2019, p. 22,
2.

The Court’s Response

l.

it

was going

“I thought there

t0

was an

22.

t0 the Jurv’s Question

Does Not Provide a Basis for a

New Trial
If the Appellant

can somehow get around the fact

Court’s response t0 the jury’s question, there

it

did not timely or properly obj ect t0 the

was nevertheless n0

29

error.

The Court’s simple, one

sentence response t0 the jury’s question

that

was

comes anywhere near justifying a new
There

is

proper.

trial

It

certainly

was not a prejudicial

error 0f law

0f this case.

a plethora of Idaho case law identifying the speciﬁc legal standard the

party needs to establish on a motion for
instructions. This

new

trial

based upon

Court has 0n numerous occasions

The Court’s review ofjury
ofwhether the
the issues and

how

moving

the trial court dealt With jury

stated:

instruction

is

‘limited t0 a determination

and adequately present
the instructions, as a Whole, d0

instructions, as a Whole, fairly
state the law.

When

not mislead 0r prejudice a party, an erroneous instruction does not

The appellant has the burden
from an erroneous jury instruction.

constitute reversible error.’

show
Garcia

v.

Hardware

prejudicial error

Windley, 144 Idaho 539, 543, 64 P.3d 817 (2007). See also,

v.

t0 clearly

e.g,

Lakeland True Value

Hartford Fire Ins. C0., 153 Idaho 716, 291 P.3d 399 (2012); Mackay

Packing C0,, 151 Idaho 388, 257 P.3d 755 (201
187 (2005); Howell

v.

1);

v.

Four Rivers

Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 127 P.3d

Eastern Idaho R.R., Ina, 135 Idaho 733 (2001). In

all

0fthe case law,

this

Court repeatedly emphasizes that the jury instructions need t0 be taken as a whole, and that even
if there is

an erroneous instruction that was given,

address the issues and state the law, there
In this regard, the Appellant

instructions that

In fact,

WPT’S

instructions,

fairly

no basis

for a

a Whole fairly

new trial.

not complaining about any of the other myriad of jury

were given t0 the jury by the Court, most 0f Which were pattern IDJI

counsel repeatedly said “n0 objection” as the Court went through

and everything

n0 issue With

is

is

if the overall instructions as

literally

WPT

argued

for,

any 0f the other jury

they got.

Tn,

instructions.

May

Thus,

and adequately addressed the legal standards applicable

3,

all

instructions.

the proposed

2019, pp. 81-100.

WPT

WPT had

agreed those instructions

t0 this case

under Idaho law. The

simple one sentence innocuous response that the “legal point 0f employment

is

when

the parties

agree” does not d0 anything t0 detract from that basic point that the overall jury instructions as a
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whole

fairly

addressed the issues and Idaho law. Based upon the applicable legal standard, that

could and should be the end of it.

On the subj ect of any possible prejudice by the one
court

commented that the response did not seem

other. Speciﬁcally, the

Tr.,

May

3,

Court commented:

2019, p. 184,

ll.

“It

trial

favorable 0r unfavorable for any one party 0r the

could be beneﬁcial 0r detrimental t0 either 0f you.”

Here again,

15-16.

sentence response by the court, the

that could

and should be the end of considering

this issue.

Beyond these basic

considerations, the Appellant’s arguments d0 nothing t0 dissuade

the foregoing conclusions that there

unfair prejudice justifying a

error in

error 0f

law

in the response given

In fact, if anything,

trial.

it

makes

and there was no

the point 0f there being

no

law 0r prejudice even stronger.

The Appellant begins
is

new

was no

from

the argument with a brief mention 0f the “right t0 control” test that

used in Idaho and elsewhere for making a determination as to Whether an individual should be

considered an employee or agent of the employer. That has absolutely nothing to do with the issue
presented here. There

years.

his

N0

question

employment

is

n0 doubt

that

was ever raised

Andy Hawes was

in this case as to

in fact

employed by

WPT for numerous

whether his employer had the right

to control

related activities.

The Appellant

cites to a

number 0f

decisions in workers compensation cases outside 0f

Idaho that address situations Where a claimant

is

injured and the question arises whether that

employee was operating Within the scope and course 0f his employment
Here again, those

fact

and

legal scenarios

Moreover, none 0f these foreign

have absolutely nothing

state

t0

at the

time of the injury.

do With the issue

in this case.

workers compensation cases actually support

WPT’S

argument. They are instead consistent with the one sentence response provided by the Court that
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“the legal point 0f

employment

is

Younger

outcome of

that case

example,

v.

City

were

is

when

the parties agree.”

The

and County ofDenver, 801 P.2d 647

that

ﬁrst case cited

by WPT,
The

(C010. 1991).

facts

for

and

an applicant injured during pre-employment testing was denied

workers’ compensation beneﬁts because “there was n0 mutual agreement” sufﬁcient t0 create an

employer-employee relationship
court followed the

same basic

at the

at the

Id. at

653 (emphasis added). The Colorado
0f employment begins When the

legal precept that the legal point

parties agree, but determined there

person was an employee

time 0f injury.

had

n_ot

time 0f injury.

been a “mutual agreement” by the
It is

parties that the

entirely consistent with the notion

embodied

in

the Court’s single sentence response to the jury question here.

Appellant also cites to Dykes

v.

State Accident Ins. Fund, 613 P.2 1106 (Oregon 1980).

There, the Oregon Supreme Court rejected the claimant’s argument about a possibility 0f future

employment being sufﬁcient
this follows the

agree.

The

same basic

parties in

t0 support

an actual contract for employment.

legal principle that the legal point of

is

When

Again,

the parties

employment.

The Appellant next provides a laundry
already reached an agreement to
ﬁlling out forms and the like.

of these forms being ﬁlled

list

of things that

Andy Hawes

did after he had

become employed by Western Paciﬁc Timber,

However, there was absolutely no evidence

employment agreement 0n the

The bottom

employment

1107.

Dykes had not reached any agreement of actual employment, but instead had

just a possibility 0f future

the

Id. at

three essential terms here

was

in

that involved

in this case suggesting

any way conditioned upon any

out.

line issue in this case is

agreement between Mr. Hawes and

whether there was an enforceable employment

WPT. The jury was

instructions dealing with this area of contract

given

law upon which
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all

t0

0f the applicable IDJI approved

make

its

decision.

WPT agreed

the instructions given t0 the jury as a

Whole

that apply to this

employment agreement

deny the motion

for

WPT
follows:

Under Idaho law,

that is

an entirely proper basis t0

Issue

frames the issue concerning

“Whether there was

substantial

its

equitable estoppel defense

profoundly

ﬂawed assignment 0f error

on appeal precisely

and competent evidence for the jury

afﬁrmative defense 0f equitable estoppel.”

its

substantial

and adequately covered Idaho legal principles

new trial.

established

is

case.

The Equitable Estoppel Defense

D.

fairly

t0

to

have found

Appellant ’s Brief at I8.

as

WPT

This

is

a

an appellate court. Questions relating t0 Whether there

and competent evidence on a claim or defense

relate t0

whether that claim or defense

should be, 0r should have been, submitted t0 the jury in the ﬁrst place. Here, the jury considered

and rejected the defense.
defense

is

T0 argue

there

was

substantial

competent evidence in support of a

not a basis t0 overturn a jury’s verdict 0n that defense, and never has been under Idaho

law.

Once a party has

a claim or defense submitted to the jury, and the jury

rej ects

it,

Idaho law

has very clear and speciﬁc rules and standards by which that party can seek relief from that verdict
0r judgment.

This, 0f course,

would include motions

for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict

under I.R.C.P. 50(b) and/or motions for new trial under I.R.C.P. 59. Appellant chose not to pursue

any of these
it is

post-trial

motions on the equitable estoppel issue following the jury verdict. Instead,

raising this issue for the ﬁrst time

raised for the ﬁrst time

779 (2013); Brooks

v.

0n appeal. This Court has a longstanding

0n appeal will not be considered.

See, e.g., Insight

is

no

Gunter, 154 Idaho

Wal—Mart Stores, Ina, 164 Idaho 22, 423 P.3d 442 (2018); Taylor v. Taylor,

163 Idaho 910, 422 P.3d 1116 (2018). The issue as phrased by
appeal. There

v.

rule that issues

legal basis t0 give

WPT the relief
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it

WPT is not a proper issue for this

seeks 0f setting aside the jury verdict 0n

the grounds that there

was

substantial competent evidence in support of their equitable estoppel

defense.

The

trial

court considered whether there

was

substantial

equitable estoppel defense sufﬁcient to justify submitting

objected and the matter

Tn,

May 3,

2019, p. 87-90; p. 95,

WPT

1-20.

was argued

20-25; p. 96,

The

prevailed 0n this issue.

t0 the jury.

some length

t0 the trial court at

ll.

it

1-24; p. 97,

ll.

competent evidence 0n

ll.

evidence that justiﬁed submitting the question t0 the jury Whether
defense of equitable estoppel. Tn,
107,

ll.

1-16.

As

prevailed in the

May 3,

such, the issue that

trial

2019, p. 96,

WPT

court proceedings.

ll.

It is,

7-25; p. 98,

was

WPT

12-25; p. 97,

frames 0n this appeal

Counsel for Mr. Hawes

at the instruction conference.

court agreed there

trial

WPT’S

is

ll.

ll.

1-25; p. 99,

ll.

substantial competent

proved

its

1-2; p. 106,

afﬁrmative

ll.

10-25; p.

an issue upon Which they

0f course, well established under Idaho law that in

order for an issue t0 be raised on appeal, the record must reveal an adverse ruling Which forms the
basis for the assignment of error.

(2016); Whitted

v.

cannot satisfy this

It

was

Canyon

See, e.g., Ballard

Cnty. Bd.

criteria as

0fC0mm ’rs,

WPT

they prevailed on the ruling on this point.

WPT’S

equitable estoppel defense.

WPT

is

The

actual standard of review for such an issue are

JNOV motions under I.R.C.P.

50(b) (although such motions “must” be served

attempting t0 have the verdict “set aside.”

within 14 days of the entry of judgment).

I.R.C.P. 50(b)(1).

competent evidence” standard, motions for
favor 0f the jury’s verdict, including

was

Kerr, 160 Idaho 674, 694, 378 P.3d 464

137 Idaho 118, 121, 44 P.3d 1173 (2002).

the jury that unanimously rejected

those provided for

v.

all

JNOV

The

trial

require the court t0 construe

all

evidence in

reasonable inferences in order t0 determine whether there

substantial evidence t0 support the verdict.

643, 827 P.2d 656 (1992).

Rather than a “substantial and

court

is

Watson

v.

Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp, 121 Idaho

also not free t0
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weigh the evidence or pass on the

credibility

evidence

0f witnesses for the purpose of

is

motions.

Instead

it

must address Whether the

sufﬁcient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could reach the

Smith

conclusion as the jury did.

The

JNOV

legal standard

If there

upon which

were

t0

v.

same

Praegitzer, 113 Idaho 887, 749 P.2d 1012 (Ct.App. 1988).

WPT makes this argument 0n appeal is just wrong.

be any consideration 0f the actual evidence 0n

this defense,

WPT had t0

prove there was a concealment of the material fact 0f the severance agreement and that

concealment was made With the speciﬁc intent that

and acted upon the concealment

to

in

the fact that

when

approached Mr. Hawes and asked to

know What he was

new owners

of the

it

and

that

WPT relied

Campbell, 145 Idaho 727, 732, 184

v.

WPT established is that Mr. Hawes did not tell the new

2012 about the severance agreement that was reached in 2005. In this regard,

make much of

he could

Winn

t0 their prejudice.

P.3d 852 (2008). The one and only thing

owners

WPT would rely upon

doing.

taking over

the

new owners took

over in 2012, one of the owners

tell

him everything he needed to know about

Tn,

May 2,

2019, p. 262,

management of

ll.

22-24.

the

how

t0 “operate the business.”

the day-to-day affairs 0f

manager Mr. Dolan testiﬁed,
out 0f the mess

it

was

in.”

the time about the here and

his job at that point

Tn,

May 2,

May

Tn,

“was

2019, p. 267,

now and how they were

t0

ll.

2,

2019, p. 264,

make

2-4.

sure this

company

so

This was a circumstance

WPT, which had

previously been handled exclusively by Mr. Blixseth. The owner was asking Mr.

information 0n

WPT tried

ll.

Hawes

3-4.

company

As

for the

the

new

steered a course

In other words, they were worried at

going t0 run the business they had previously

not run.

Mr. Hawes openly acknowledged he did not talk t0 the two owners about the severance
agreement in 2012 because

it

had n0 bearing 0n what was going 0n

not intending t0 leave employment.

On the

contrary, he
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was

still

at the time.

Mr. Hawes was

looking forward to a long future

with the company. Tn,

May I,

2019, p. I20,

the time the severance agreement

“was the

ll.

18-25; p. I21,

furthest

my

from

In fact, Mr.

1-10.

ll.

I-I 0. Mr.

Hawes was not

“intentionally concealing” anything

agreement simply had nothing t0 do With What was going on
crisis

by

WPT

for the lack

In sum,

issue

E.

WPT

2019, p. I21,

from the owners. His severance

at that

time

When there was immediate

of knowing about the severance agreement.

severance agreement was already fully vested and again

WPT until Mr. Hawes’

May 1,

WPT could not possibly establish any

based on a sudden change of management. Further,

prejudice

said at

mind” because he was “looking

forward t0 moving forward with the company and looking in the future.” Tn,

ll.

Hawes

it

By

that time, the

would not have any impact

at all

0n

employment was terminated.

has not

made

a proper assignment 0f error for appellate purposes, and n0

presented upon Which this Court can rule.

is

The District Court Properly Allowed Mr. Hawes
bv Mr. Blixseth 0n Behalf 0f WPT

t0 Testify

Concerning Statements

WPT next appeals the trial court’s evidentiary ruling allowing Mr.
the statements

owner of

made by Mr.

WPT

Blixseth.

It

discretion standard

trial

court’s rulings

on review. The argument on appeal

in allowing this testimony pursuant to Idaho

legal merit.

It is

fact,

WPT

that

counsel

t0

was

the

qualify as

an abuse of

Judge Schroeder abused his discretion

Rule 0f Evidence 801(d)(2)

WPT’S

would

0n evidence are subject

undisputed that Mr. Blixseth was the sole owner of

severance agreement was reached. In

t0 testify about

ruled they were not hearsay because Mr. Blixseth

and therefore any statements he made on behalf of

admissions 0f a party opponent. The

Hawes

m

is

devoid of factual or

WPT

in

the foundation

2005 when the

was

laid that

Mr.

Blixseth

was

WPT t0

d0 business in Idaho, identifying Mr. Hawes as the registered agent, and Mr. Blixseth as

the sole

owner by

Virtue of the ﬁling With the Idaho Secretary of State registering
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the “sole

ll.

member.”

Plaintiﬁ’iv Exh. 46; Tn, April 30, 2019, p. 30,

ll.

14-2I;p. 31,

ll.

8-23;p. 32,

7-12.

WPT
Blixseth

argues more was needed to establish the requisite foundation, speciﬁcally that Mr.

was

on behalf 0f

acting

WPT

When

the oral severance agreement

was reached

at the

dinner meeting in June 0f 2005. This argument completely ignores the testimony offered by Mr.

Hawes about the
testiﬁed that he

events that preceded this dinner meeting over the prior four months. Mr.

worked With Mr. Blixseth 0n behalf 0f WPT exclusively

t0 this dinner meeting. Tn, April 30, 2019, p. 28,

ll.

I 7-25; p. 29,

amount of legal work performed by Mr. Hawes exclusively
the several

through Mr. Blixseth as

And, prior

t0

its

sole

owner and agent prior t0 the dinner meeting

Mr. Hawes discussing the actual agreement reached

speciﬁcally inquiring whether Mr.

replied he

Tic,

Hawes had “an

April 30, 2019, p. 39,

would be

ll.

set

me

about

interest in ioining

24-25; p. 40,

ll.

interested in talking about that, Mr.

some

in

is

at the

it.”

1-20 (“My offer

Tn, April 30, 2019, p. 40,

is

t0 hire

you
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only

Western Paciﬁc Timber as an

1-2 (emphasis added). After Mr.

Hawes then testiﬁed about another
after the ﬁrst email, “reaching out

ll.

1 1-19

at

and looking

(emphasis added).

Mr. Hawes’ direct testimony that the job offer that was made

ll.

WPT

dinner meeting,

t0

him

meeting was speciﬁcally t0 act as in-house counsel for Western Paciﬁc Timber.
2019, p. 46,

length. Tn,

June 2005.

my interest in joining Western Paciﬁc Timber as an in-house attorney,

schedule the meeting t0 discuss
again, there

at

up was receiving an email from Mr. Blixseth

communication received from Mr. Blixseth about a week 0r so
t0

WPT through Mr. Blixseth during

Mr. Hawes thus had a wealth 0f experience working for

Mr. Hawes also testiﬁed the way that meeting was

in-house attorney.”

months prior

was a signiﬁcant

1-23. There

months prior t0 the dinner meeting. Mr. Hawes testiﬁed about this

April 30, 2019, pp. 28-39.

Hawes

for

ll.

for several

Hawes

t0

And,

at the dinner

Tn, April 30,

Western Paciﬁc Timber as an in-house

On

attorney. ...”)

the particular point about the severance agreement, Mr.

“And the severance package was

Western Paciﬁc Timber would agree

this:

$100,000 per year for every year that
2019, p. 47,

ll.

I

was With

the

company, up

t0

ﬁve

Hawes
to give

years.”

also testiﬁed:

me

severance,

Tr.,

April 30,

20-23 (emphasis added).

Judge Schroeder’s evidentiary rulings allowing for the subject testimony was an
appropriate exercise of his discretion, particularly in light 0f the substantial foundation that

was

laid.

The

F.

District Court’s Decision

Awarding Attornev’s Fees Was Not an Abuse of

Discretion

Appellant correctly notes that a

Code,

§

45-615

is

discretionary.

recently clariﬁed that

When

trial

court’s

award 0f attorney’s

And, Appellant correctly notes

fees

and costs under Idaho

that the Idaho

Supreme Court has

the appellate court reviews an alleged abuse 0f discretion

by

the

trial

court that the appellate court engages in afour tiered inquiry:

When

court the

Court reviews an alleged abuse 0f discretion by a trial
sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four

essentials.

Whether the

as

this

one of discretion;

(1) correctly perceived the issue

trial court:

(2) acted within the outer

boundaries 0f

its

discretion; (3) acted consistently With the legal standards applicable
to the speciﬁc choices available t0

it;

and

(4)

reached

its

decision

by

the exercise of reason.

Lunneborg

v.

My Fun Life,

acknowledged the case law
also noted

it

163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187 (2018). The Court in Lunneborg
for

many years

was not changing anything about the case law characterized

instead just took the opportunity to clarify

that actually required

The Idaho

by a

trial

referred t0 this as a “three-prong”

two separate

things.

test.

Id.

The Court

as a three-prong test, but

What had previously been a compound second sentence
Lunneborg, 163 Idaho

at 864.

appellate decisions regarding the standard of review for discretionary decisions

court require the appellate court to answer the four questions posed
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by

this appellate

standard of review. Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 867 (“On appeal

prong standard for discretionary review has been met”)

M

we

review whether the four-

While the Appellant recognizes the

foregoing as the clearly established standard of review of discretionary decisions by a
it

does not provide any kind of analysis as t0

Instead,

WPT

how

trial court,

these four questions should be answered here.

simply re-argues the facts they argued below, and

is

asking this Court to second-

guess Judge Schroeder’s discretionary decision.

There

no doubt

is

that

Judge Schroeder understood the question of whether attorney’s fees

should 0r should be awarded, and
before the

about

so

What amount, was discretionary on his

court on the attorney’s fees issues, there were

part.

At the hearing

numerous references by

all

parties

being a purely discretionary decision under Idaho Code, § 45-615. Tn, June 20, 2019, pp.

it

23-50.

trial

if

The

trial

his exercise

court also speciﬁcally asked counsel for any input 0r guidance suggestions about

of discretion.

Tn, June 20, 2019, p. 31,

ll.

3-8; p. 32,

ll.

8-13.

And,

in his written

decision he speciﬁcally noted that “the Court has discretion.” R., p. 1459.

Judge Schroeder also clearly satisﬁed the second
boundaries 0f

[his] discretion.”

The amount 0f attorney’s

amount

that the Plaintiff would actually

there

n0 reasonable question

is

criteria

that

be obligated

to

by having “acted within

fees that

pay

were awarded were

his attorneys

(Aug, p.

3).

the outer

in fact the

Likewise,

Judge Schroeder acted “consistently with the legal standards

applicable t0 the speciﬁc choices available” 0n the motion for an award 0f fees. Idaho Code, § 45-

615 clearly allows for the recovery 0f attorney’s fees
above the trebling of the wages
Finally,

reason.

t0

make

At

it is

beyond

the hearing

at issue.

clear that

at the discretion

of the

trial court,

over and

Idaho Code, § 45-615(2).

Judge Schroeder reached his decision by the exercise 0f

0n the attorney’s

fees issue, Judge Schroeder

made

a point that he wanted

certain to speciﬁcally articulate his reasoning in a written decision as
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he had seen other

judges

fail to

do,

Which caused problems. Tn, June

20, 2019, and his written decision

2019.

R., p.

was issued

three

20, 2019, p. 5],

months

later,

ll.

14-23. That

speciﬁcally 0n September 26,

I458. Judge Schroeder’s written decision clearly speaks for

very thoughtful and involves the

trial

was 0n June

itself,

but

is

obviously

court addressing each and every one 0f the 10 factors

provided by I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). And, every single point made by Judge Schroeder was factually
true throughout his written decision. R. atpp. 1458-61.

Judge Schroeder’s analysis makes

it

clear that the tenor 0f his decision

Respondent had basically earned and deserved an award 0f signiﬁcant attorney’s
hard case with

many

fees.

that the

It

was a

complexities, and Judge Schroeder acknowledged that early on in the matter

he thought Plaintiff would have very

acknowledged

was

that:

little

“However, as the

chance of Winning.

trial

R., p.

1461. Judge Schroeder then

progressed and the threats 0f public humiliation

diminished and the comparative integrity and credibility of the witnesses evolved, the balance
shifted, as

evidenced by the jury verdict.”

was responding to the

fact that Plaintiffwent

unsubstantiated claims 0f being called a

Judge saw that

As t0

the threats 0f public humiliation, Judge Schroeder

through two years’ worth ofbeing subjected t0 totally

liar

and a cheat and unethical.

On

the eve of

employer in a public
65.

the

WPT made paltry efforts at settlement and basically argued the Respondent should

be Willing to accept such paltry offers because, among other things, he will “have

Aug, p.

trial,

setting

0n

its

t0 face his

former

claim that [the Respondent] breached his ﬁduciary duty t0

it.”

And, the trial was ﬁlled With the continuation ofthe attempted smear campaign against

Mr. Hawes that was completely undeserved, unsubstantiated, and unproven. Those were among
the reasons Judge Schroeder thoughtfully concluded that: “It

wage claim law

t0

is

consistent with the purpose 0f the

allow [the Respondent] the beneﬁt 0f that verdict.” R. atp. 1461.
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In sum, the Respondent respectfully submits that the

award 0f attorney’s fees followed the law

trial

court’s determination in this

exactly, articulated his reasoning at length,

and

represented an appropriate exercise 0f his discretion.

G.

Respondent Should Be Awarded Attornev’s Fees 0n Appeal
The Respondent

also requests an

award 0f attorney’s fees and costs 0n appeal pursuant

Idaho Code, § 45-615(2) and/or Idaho Code, § 12-121. The issues on

m

award

all

costs

and attorney

fees.

Idaho Code Section 12-

121 also gives Courts discretion to award costs and attorney fees whenever an appeal

unreasonably, Without foundation

01‘

simply not

Idaho Code Section 45-615(2) speciﬁcally provides any

well taken and have n0 legal support.
“court 0f competent jurisdiction”

this appeal are

t0

Sea,

frivolously.

e.g.,

Scott

v.

is

brought

Castle, 104 Idaho 719,

662

P.2d 1163 (Ct.App. 1983).

Most of this appeal simply

boils

down t0

WPT asking this Court t0

WPT is re-arguing the same facts and points

verdict.

it

made

second—guess the jury

WPT was never

to the jury below.

denied any chance to introduce evidence on any of their claims or defenses.

It

was

certainly not

denied any opportunity t0 argue those points below. Worse, the argument there was n0 substantial

competent evidence to support the

more

facts and,

Plaintiff’s claims involves

WPT cherry picking some selective

importantly, ignoring very sizeable and important evidence that

is

directly

contrary.

It is

well established where a defendant’s appeal just invites the appellate court to second

guess the

trial

court 0n conﬂicting evidence, an award 0f attorney’s fees 0n appeal

DeChambeau

v.

Estate omeith, 132 Idaho 568, 976 P.2d 922 (1999); Crowley

v.

is

proper. See,

Critchﬁeld, 145

Idaho 509, 181 P.3d 435 (2007).

The
frivolous.

equitable estoppel issue raised

It

0n appeal

is

entirely without foundation

and frankly

has never been a legal standard anywhere to set aside a jury verdict on the ground
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that there

was

substantial

and competent evidence

t0 support a different decision.

standards that d0 apply to try t0 and set aside a jury verdict are substantially

that

under I.R.C.P. 50 and/or 59. Simply put, there

is

no

legal support

The jury

to support

instruction issue in this case

t0 the case.

is

also without reasonable foundation.

they have not established that

it

was

WPT

in incorrect statement

The claimed prejudice they argue they had with

It

was an

actually agreed

0f law that applied

the Court’s response

is

imagined and

And, regardless 0f everything else, WPT did not object t0 any 0f the Court’s other proposed

By

jury instructions at the jury instruction conference.
that the jury instructions as a

turn

0n the grounds there

WPT can somehow get around the fact they did not make an adequate record t0 preserve

this issue for appeal,

unreal.

more rigorous than

it.

innocuous, simple, non-controversial response proposed by the Court that
with. If

legal

whatsoever for an appellate

court t0 reverse the jury’s decision rejecting the equitable estoppel defense

was some evidence

The

means even

if the

that is not sufﬁcient

Whole

fairly stated the

means

Idaho law that applied t0

WPT was
this case,

grounds to

Which

in

set aside the jury verdict.

made below, only

Schroeder’s discretionary decision.

this

It is

by

time

WPT
it

is

is

also just asking this Court t0 second-

asking the Court t0 second-guess Judge

more than obvious

in the record that

provided a thoughtful and very carefully considered exercise 0f his discretion 0n
just re-argued the

satisﬁed

simple one sentence response was in error, Idaho law clearly establishes

Finally, the attorney’s fees issue raised

guess the decision

deﬁnition, this

same points

it

made

t0 the trial court

this issue.

below without even attempting

the four questions that the standard 0f review requires being answered
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Judge Schroeder

0n

this appeal.

WPT

to address

In sum, the Respondent respectfully submits this appeal
respectfully requests this Court issue an

appeal, pursuant to Idaho

was not

substantially justiﬁed,

and

Mr. Hawes on

this

award 0f attorney’s fees and costs

Code Section 45-615(2)

or Idaho

t0

Code Section 12-121.

Dated: February 27, 2020

HEPWORTH HOLZER, LLP
/s/J0hn

By:

J.

Janis

John J. Janis
John W. Kluksdal
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent
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hereby certify that 0n this date, I electronically ﬁled With the Clerk 0f the Court the
foregoing Respondent’s Brief using the ICourt E-File system which Will send notiﬁcation of such
I

ﬁling

to:

Debora Kristensen Grasham

Amber N. Dina
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
Boise,

ID 83702

Email: dknggivenspursley£om

amberdina@givenspurslevcom

Dated: February 27, 2020
/s/John

John
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Janis

Janis

